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p ATENTS - LICENSING - LEGALITY OF GRANT-BACK CLAUSES -
There is no authoritative definition of the term "patent grant-
back."1 It has been defined as a clause in a patent license which 
provides "for license or assignment to the licensor of any improve-
ment patented by the licensee in the products or processes of the 
licensed patent."2 In litigated cases grant-back clauses usually ap-
pear either in basic patent licenses or in licenses of the products or 
processes of an industry which the licensor dominates through con-
trol of a multitude of overlapping patents. 
Relation to Patent Misuse 
In 1946 in Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes &- Smith 
Co. (Trans Wrap J3 the question of the criteria to be used in evalu-
ating the legality of an improvement patent grant-back was clearly 
raised for the first time. The Supreme Court held that though 
grant-back clauses can easily be used to violate the antitrust laws, 
they are not illegal per se as a patent misuse. 
In the TransWrap case the vendor, in connection with the sale 
of a business, exclusively licensed its patents to the vendee. One 
clause in the license required the vendee to submit to the vendor 
any patentable ideas so that the vendor could take out improve-
ment patents if it so desired. The vendee was permitted to use the 
improvement patents in connection with both the basic patents 
and on any non-competing product without additional charge. 
The vendee failed to submit its improvements to the vendor. When 
the vendor then elected to terminate the license, the vendee sued 
for a declaratory judgment that the grant-back clause was contrary 
to public policy and unenforceable. 
Prior to 1946 grant-back clauses occasionally appeared in liti-
gated cases but in no case was the clause found to be illegal.4 In 
1 In several cases the term reciprocal licenses has been used to cover what is here 
meant by "patent grant-back." 
2 REPORT OF TilE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITI"EE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 227 (1955), hereinafter referred to as REPORT. This comment deals only 
with grant-backs in bilateral licenses. For patent pool agreements containing grant-backs, 
see, e.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., (E.D. Mich. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 304, affd. 343 U.S. 
444 (1952); Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., (9th Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d) 
80; United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., (E.D. Mich. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 74, noted 
in 54 MICH. L. REv. 713 (1956); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry and Machine 
Co., (W.D. Pa. 1956) 139 F. Supp. 244. 
3 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
4Allbright-Nell Co. v. Stanley Hiller Co., (7th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 392; Gasoline 
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., (D.C. Me. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 511; Bunker v. 
Stevens. (C.C. N.J. 1885) 26 F. 245; American Refining Co. v. Gasoline Products Co., 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927} 294 S.W. 967. 
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1945 the Supreme Court in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States5 
approved a decree which, inter alia, enjoined the defendants from 
inserting a grant-back clause in licenses of glassware and glassmak-
ing equipment patents but the Court disallowed that portion of the 
decree which would have extended the in junction to the other 
patents held by the defendants. The Court felt that the broad 
prohibitions of the district court decree, only one of which was the 
grant-back injunction, if applied to all of the defendants' patents, 
would have had a tendency to stop all inventions or acquisitions of 
patents in any field by the defendants, a result not desired by the 
Court. The decree would have set such important limitations upon 
the reward which could have been secured by the defendants from 
the ownership of patents as to make the defendants' patents practi-
cally worthless.6 Since Hartford-Empire was primarily a licensing 
rather than a manufacturing company, a patent was of little value 
to the defendants if it could not be effectively licensed. 
The trial court found that the grant-back clause was lawful 
throughout and not within the doctrine of the misuse cases.7 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit speaking through Judge 
Learned Hand (Judge Swan dissenting) felt that the vendor had 
used its basic patent monopoly to force others to buy from it things 
outside of the four walls of the patent.8 It relied primarily on the 
fact that after the expiration of the basic patent, the vendor would 
have the control over the improvement patents that the vendee 
would have had. The result of this argument, based on the misuse 
cases, is that an assignment grant-back is illegal per se. 
The Supreme Court disagreed.9 The patent statute expressly 
permits the assignment of patents and places no restrictions on the 
consideration for such assignment.10 The effect on the improve-
ment patentee is the same whether he assigns for a monetary con-
sideration or whether the consideration is the right to use the basic 
patent. The court then conceded that though a patentee has the 
right to refuse a license he cannot demand an unlawful condition. 
The court found that a grant-back clause did not constitute an 
unlawful condition because the patent laws already recognized the 
15 323 U.S. 386 (1945). 
6 Id. at 423, 424. 
7 Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 68 
U.S.P.Q. 28. 
s Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. 
(2d) 198. 
9 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
10 66 Stat. 810 (1952), 35 U.S.C. (1952) §261. 
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monopoly right in the improvement patent. The basic patentee 
was using his property to acquire a lawful monopoly. The misuse 
doctrine does not apply where the patent monopoly is used to 
acquire other lawful monopolies. It exists only where the patent 
monopoly is used to control activities outside of any legalized mo-
nopoly. Therefore, since the grant-back provision is not a patent 
misuse and since the patent statute expressly recognizes the right 
of a patentee to assign his patents without regard to the considera-
tion, a patent grant-back clause is not illegal per se. 
This decision effectively cut off any further judicial discussion 
of a patent grant-back as a patent misuse as such. However, even 
at this late date it may be worthwhile to examine this phase of the 
decision. 
If the problem presented by this case is analyzed as a question 
of the enforcement of a promise to assign improvement patents for 
which the consideration is the right to use certain basic patents, 
then there seems to be no choice but to say with the court that the 
promise to assign improvements is legal per se and the considera-
tion is both adequate and legal. However, if this is analyzed as a 
license of a basic patent in partial consideration for which a prom-
ise to assign improvement patents is given, it would seem that we 
must still see whether the grant-back would constitute a patent 
misuse. The enforcement of the promise would give the licensor 
control over other articles which, but for the patent, he would not 
possess. In prior misuse cases this control was over unpatented 
articles.11 The Court, however, seemed to feel that if a monopoly 
has been legally established in one limited area, it is no longer 
in the public interest who controls the monopoly short of a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. 
The public interest served by the patent laws is to stimulate 
the invention of new products and processes by giving an oppor-
tunity for monopoly profits from the patented article.12 Here there 
may be no one who is stimulated to further invention. The licensor 
will gain income for the period of his existing patents and during 
the period of every improvement patent. The licensee has an in-
11 E.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In the principal 
case the Court disregarded the fact that in TransWrap the ideas were to be unpatented 
when turned over to the licensor and it was only through the failure of the licensee to 
live up to its bargain that patents had already been issued. 
12 "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." U.S. CoNsr., art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
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terest in lowering his costs at present by improving the basic patent 
but has a stronger interest in not making improvements because 
every improvement lengthens the time during which it will be 
necessary to be licensed. Since it is practically impossible to con-
tinue making any product for ten to fifteen years without improv-
ing it, the licensee may never be able to get out of the circle and 
still stay in the industry.13 By giving this additional power to the 
patentee, the court may have increased the incentive to produce 
basic inventions, but it would seem that this same incentive, if 
desired, would be better achieved through a lengthening of the 
patent monopoly by Congress. 
Relation to Antitrust Laws 
Legitimate Uses for Grant-Back. The use to which a particular 
business device is put will often determine whether it will be held 
to be in violation of the antitrust laws. Trans Wrap well illustrates 
the uses to which a patentee may legitimately wish to put a patent 
grant-back. The license was for a period of ten years, thereafter 
renewable for further periods of five years. Upon certain named 
contingencies (bankruptcy of the licensee, etc.) the license was to 
terminate. The expectation was that if the license did terminate 
the licensor would itself then resume producing the patented ar-
ticle. It was important to the licensor that it be assured that if it 
resumed manufacturing the patented article the article would be 
competitive. This would only be possible if it were to take over 
the improved product. This is also true if a licensor continues to 
produce the patented article under its basic patent and also licenses 
others. The licensor will not wish to lose out on improvements 
made by the licensees, not because it is desirous of controlling the 
industry with its patent block, but because it wishes to continue to 
compete with its licensees in the production of the patented article. 
If the licensee is able to use the licensor's patents, it seems only fair 
to allow the licensor to demand that he be allowed to use the 
13 If the grant-back was to be an assignment, the basic patentee would become owner 
of the improvement patents as well. In addition, if the basic patentee licensed numerous 
licensees all of whom agreed to grant-back licenses with right to sublicense, each licensee 
would be able to use its own improvement patents but would still need to secure licenses 
of the improvements patented by the other licensees. Although they could secure licenses 
from each patentee individually, as a practical matter they would undoubtedly go to the 
basic patentee who could license substantially all of the industry's patents at one time. 
It is only where there is but one licensee of the basic patentee giving a license grant-back 
(or such a small number as to make feasible the securing of licenses of improvement 
patents from each other individually) that the licensee will eventually be able to produce 
without license from the basic patentee. 
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licensee's improvements. Similarly, if a decree requires compul-
sory licensing, then it may be felt that the patentee should be 
allowed to demand grant-backs of improvement patents or the 
licensees will be in the extraordinary position of being able to get 
all of the advantages of the licensor's inventiveness and yet be able 
to keep its own improvements for its own advantage.14 In a given 
fact situation this might even lead to the licensee achieving a 
monopoly position in an industry. 
Type of Grant-Back. It was not necessary for the TransWrap 
licensor to secure an assignment of the improvement patents in 
order to protect itself. The only legitimate purpose of the grant-
back was to enable the licensor to manufacture and license the im-
proved machine if it were necessary for him to resume production. 
A nonexclusive license grant-back with power in the licensee to 
license others would have been sufficient protection. To the extent 
the improvement grant-back exceeded this standard the assign-
ments served no legitimate ends. The potential control over an 
industry afforded by assignment grant-backs far exceeds the control 
afforded by nonexclusive licenses with power to sublicense.15 
The cases have not expressly recognized this distinction. They 
have at times not even mentioned what rights under the improve-
ment patents were to be granted back.16 Only in United States v. 
General Electric Co. (carboloy)17 is it suggested that an exclusive 
license is more conducive to antitrust violation than a nonexclu-
sive license. The interesting fact is that assignment grant-backs 
have been approved in the cases more often than not,18 while license 
grant-backs have more often than not been disapproved.19 The 
14 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 360 (1947); United States v. 
General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835. 
15 See REPORT 228, 229. 
16 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 
at 232; Houdry Process Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Co., (E.D. Pa. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 320. 
17 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005. Earlier in the opinion, at 1000, Judge 
Knox said that the licenses were nonexclusive. With one exception the court does not 
explain why the nonexclusive licenses were in effect exclusive. See 17 UNIV. CHr. L. REv. 
357, 367-369 (1950). 
18 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (partially allowed in 
decree); Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes &: Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (not 
illegal per se); Stokes &: Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 
161 F. (2d) 565 (on remand for antitrust finding); Modern Art Printing Co. v. Skeels, 
(D.C. N.J. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 426 at 433, revd. on other grounds (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. 
(2d) 719. Contra, United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 
F. Supp. 215. 
19 United States v. National Lead Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513 at 518 
(exclusive license); United States v. General Electric Co. (carboloy), (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 
80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005 (see note 17 supra); United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. 
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explanation is that rarely can a monopoly be fashioned out of grant-
backs alone. It is just coincidence that those cases in which the 
overall pattern lead to an antitrust violation included a license 
grant-back, while in those cases in which there was no antitrust 
violation there was an assignment grant-back. All other things 
being equal, an assignment grant-back is more likely to be found 
violative of the antitrust laws than a license grant-back. 
Scope of Grant-Back. Normally the grant-back clause is limited 
to improvements in the licensed product or process. Occasionally 
a grant-back clause will extend to all future patents in the licensed 
field and could conceivably extend to all of the licensee's patents. 
It is not sufficient to look just to the wor4s of the license to deter-
mine the scope of the grant-back, however. If the patent is basic 
to the industry, an improvement grant-back will still bring in all 
of the new patents, while a requirement of a grant-back of all new 
patents in a field would have little meaning if the field was re-
stricted to some insignificant product or process. 
While no case has held that a grant-back was illegal solely be-
cause of its scope, two cases point strongly in that direction. In 
United States v. General Electric Go. (lamps)20 the "B" licensees 
were required to grant-back nonexclusive licenses with a right to 
sublicense all of their present patents on incandescent light bulbs 
and those patents which they subsequently acquired. The court 
found that General Electric used its position as holder of the basic 
patents to gain control of the improvements, and that it was engaged 
in a systematic funnelling of the industry's patents into its own 
hands. The court found that the main buttress of General Elec-
tric' s position in the incandescent lamp industry was based on its 
patent position. The right to sublicense gave General Electric vir-
tual ownership of the major portion of the patents in the industry. 
Undoubtedly if the grant-back had been limited to improvements 
N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753 at 815 (nonexclusive with right to sublicense); United States 
v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950) (reciprocal license in decree denied); 
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 
409 (nonexclusive with right to sublicense); United States v. General Electric Co. Qamps), 
(D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 Qicense grant-back in decree denied as to existing 
patents but allowed as to "future patents"). Contra: United States v. National Lead Co., 
332 U.S. 319 (1947) (nonexclusive license grant-back allowed in decree); United States 
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41 at 224, affd. 351 
U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. International Business Machines Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1956) 
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[68,245 (nonexclusive license grant-back allowed in consent decree); 
United States v. }Vestern Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1956) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[68,246 
(nonexclusive license grant-back allowed in consent decree). 
20 (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835. 
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on the specific patents licensed, there would still have been found 
an antitrust violation because of General Electric's dominant posi-
tion in the industry. But the fact that General Electric demanded 
virtual ownership of every patent concerning incandescent lamps 
served to emphasize its monopolistic intentions. 
In United States v. National Lead Co.21 the grant-back extended 
to all of the patents in the titanium pigment industry. The trial 
court found that the clause was part of a scheme to eliminate com-
petition in the industry through control of the patents but did not 
state what features of the clause were the offensive ones. A court in 
a later case distinguished the grant-back clause before it from 
the one in National Lead by pointing out that National Lead's 
clause extended to all of the patents in the titanium pigment field.22 
Even if, as seems likely, the clause was illegal in part because 
of its scope, the court in National Lead does not condemn a broad 
clause per se, for the decree provided that the defendants might 
condition their licenses on a reciprocal license of any and all pat-
ents covering titanium pigments or their manufacture acquired by 
the licensees within five years of the date of the decree. 
The clause in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours b 
Co.23 extended only to improvements to the basic moistureproof 
cellophane patent. The court pointed out that only nine patents 
had in fact been granted back because of the clause. This factor 
was one of several in du Pont's licensing policy all of which pointed 
to the conclusion that du Pont was not using its patent position to 
monopolize the moistureproof cellophane industry, nor had du 
Pont's position in the industry been enhanced in any way due to 
the grant-back clause in the cellophane licenses. 
As the scope of the grant-back widens, the chance that it is 
being used by the licensor solely to effect a legitimate purpose 
lessens. No longer is the licensor who has ceased production relying 
on royalty income, as in TransWrapJ merely assured that if the 
licensee defaults, it will be able to resume production with a 
competitive product. Nor is the licensor merely assuring itself that 
it will be able to produce as improved a product under the basic 
patent as any of its licensees. The effect of the broad grant-back is 
to assure the licensor that it will have as good a product in the 
21 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
22 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) ll8 F. Supp. 
41, affd. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
23Ibid. 
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industry as any of its licensees, whether the product was made 
under the basic patent or by another process. There is no longer 
the risk that a competitor, if the competitor is a licensee, will de-
velop a competing product or process which will leave the licensor 
in a non-competitive position. However, since there is no require-
ment that other firms in the industry will receive licenses to use the 
new products or processes, the licensor may find itself in the posi-
tion of being the only firm in the industry assured of the use of a 
substantial portion of the new inventions of the industry. Although 
the reasoning of the Trans Wrap case prevents any grant-back clause 
from being found illegal per se, the use of a clause with a broad 
scope should alert a court to the possibility that the clause may be 
part of a broader picture of antitrust violation. 
Duration of Grant-Back Right. Typically the licensee must 
grant back licenses or assignments during the period of the basic 
license, the granted-back licenses or assignments to continue for 
the life of the improvement patent. In only one case has the dura-
tion of the period over which the licensee must grant back been 
significant. In the National Lead decree24 compulsory licensing 
was ordered of all existing patents and all patents to be acquired 
within the five years following the decree covering titanium pig-
ments or their manufacture. At the same time the defendants were 
permitted to require a license grant-back of all similar patents of 
the licensee presently issued or to be issued during the same five 
years. The court was not consciously thinking of the effect of a 
grant-back clause extending for more than five years but was only 
trying to be fair to the defendants. 
To date the cases indicate that if the grant-back clause operates 
over the period of the basic patent, no particular significance will 
be attributed to its duration. Nevertheless, the court should always 
consider the practical effect of a grant-back clause operating for a 
period up to seventeen years. Even though the clause may have 
been originally intended merely to protect the licensor's interest in 
the basic patent, and therefore may be considered a legitimate use 
for the clause, the industry may find that a clause extending over 
such an extended period has the practical effect of funnelling a 
significant portion of the new developments of the industry into 
the control of the licensor. If the consequence of this funnelling 
action is to contribute to market domination by the licensor or 
unreasonably to reduce the incentive to research by the licensees, 
2¼ United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
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the court should consider the duration of the clause to be of sig-
nificance in evaluating its lawfulness. It follows, therefore, that a 
clause which lasts for a period shorter than the length of the basic 
patent, and which has a correspondingly lesser effect on the licen-
sees and the industry should be less likely to be found illegal. Simi-
larly, a clause which lasts for a period longer than the life of the 
basic patent, and which has a correspondingly greater effect on the 
licensees and the industry should be more likely to be found illegal. 
Any deviation from the norm is apt to have some significance in 
showing whether the licensor intended to use the grant-back clause 
to help gain a dominant role in the industry even though the clause 
may not have played a major role. 
Market Position. On the remand of TransWrap the circuit 
court of appeals treated with the utmost respect the order of the 
Supreme Court that grant-backs were not illegal per se.25 The 
argument of the licensee that the grant-back gave the licensor a 
"double monopoly"26 because the licensor now had two patents 
where before it had only one would be true of every assignment 
grant-back, and if this "double monopoly" were found to be a vio-
lation of the antitrust laws, every assignment grant-back would be 
illegal per se. The court used a different rationale. It correctly 
pointed out that during the period of the basic patent the "double 
monopoly" was one in name only. The article could be manufac-
tured only on license from the basic patentee. The basic patentee's 
power to license was not increased21 and only the improvement 
patentee's negative command of the art was lost. After the basic 
patent expired only the improvement patents were left. The bare 
ownership of improvement patents did not raise a violation of the 
antitrust laws. The court pointed out that the record showed no 
lessening of the competitive situation in the industry. Even if some 
of the improvement patents covered machines which were not cov-
ered by the licensor's basic patent, all that would be shown is that 
the licensor had extended his control over the industry. But only 
extensions of control which are unreasonable restraints of com-
merce are illegal. In using this reasoning the court was further 
extending the Supreme Court's decision that an assignment grant-
back was not illegal per se. The Supreme Court's language was 
25 Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 565. 
26These words were first used by Justice Douglas in Transparent-Wrap Machine 
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 at 646. 
27 It should be noted, however, that it will often be easier to secure new licensees 
for the improved product than it would have been for the unimproved product. 
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used to refute only the claim that there had been a patent misuse 
because of an assignment grant-back. Since a grant-back clause by 
itself will almost never produce monopoly conditions in an indus-
try, the courts have declared a grant-back to be a violation of the 
antitrust laws only when it has been part of an overall scheme to 
control the industry. 
The defendants in National Lead produced practically 100 per-
cent of the American titanium pigments. The balance was pro-
duced by two licensees of the defendants, both of whom were under 
production, territorial and pricing restrictions. In addition they 
were compelled to grant back exclusive licenses on all improvement 
patents which they developed in the licensed field. This whole 
picture of monopoly control through the use of patents was found 
to be illegal. In 1948, in United States v. General Electric Co. 
(carboloy),28 Judge Knox made clear the effect of the market posi-
tion on the legality of a grant-back, a point which had been inher-
ent, but not expressed, in the previous decisions. 
"The trade position of the present defendants closely ap-
proximates that of the defendants in the National Lead case, 
and not that which is found in the Transparent-Wrap case. 
The employment of basic patents, or patents which may be 
basic, to compel the transfer of future patent rights, is con-
demned per se, when practiced on a scale such as is found in 
this suit. "29 
Similarly, General Electric's dominant position in the incandes-
cent lamp industry was due to its patent policies, including the use 
of grant-back clauses.30 The court found that Gene:ral Electric fol-
lowed a conscious policy of funnelling into its control all of the 
patents of its licensees having to do with the industry. 
The grant-back provision was also found illegal in United States 
v. Imperial Chemical Industries. Defendants were the dominant 
firms in the nylon industry, and the court found that the grant-back 
clause in question "perpetuate[ d] control of the product, after ex-
piration of the basic patent, for an unlawful use-the division of 
territories in restraint of United States trade."31 
An interesting example of the effects of a grant-back clause 
when the licensor is the dominant firm in the industry is illustrated 
by United States v. Aluminum Company of America.32 The grant-
2s (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989. 
29 Id. at 1006. 
80 United States v. General Electric Co. (lamps), (D.C. N.J. 1953) II5 F. Supp. 8!15. 
81 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 at 232. 
82 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 409, 4ll. 
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back was of a nonexclusive license with right to sublicense. There 
were only two competitors of Alcoa, Kaiser and Reynolds. When 
either Kaiser or Reynolds patented an improvement, Alcoa was 
able to use it as well, but the other competitor could not. The only 
solution for Kaiser and Reynolds would be to cross-license each 
other, but if this were the case, there would be no particular reason 
to spend money on research-it would be less costly to leave this to 
Alcoa. The court found that there was evidence of such reasoning 
on Kaiser and Reynold's part, for in 1949 Alcoa had 762 employees 
in research while Kaiser and Reynolds combined had 88. 
It must always be remembered that it is not the market control 
of the defendant firm which determines the legality of the clause, 
however, but the effect which a given grant-back clause has on the 
market control. Judge Learned Hand's test based on the reason-
ableness of the restraint of trade induced by the clause33 is still the 
law today. This test has been rec;:ently used in United States v. E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., where there was no showing that as 
a result of the agreement du Pont's position was in any way en-
hanced, or that others who might have desired a license were pre-
cluded from entering the field,34 and in Modern Art Printing Co. 
v. Skeels,85 where a defense to a patent infringement suit based on 
a grant-back clause was dismissed because the court found no evi-
dence pertaining to the effect of the clause on the industry. 
Decrees 
Once the defendant has been found guilty of an antitrust vio-
lation, the burden is on the defendant to show that the proposed 
decree is overly harsh and unnecessary.86 Since the decree is in-
tended only to prevent future abuse and not to punish for past 
transgressions, if the court finds that the industry's situation war-
rants the use of grant-backs, it can allow their use. In fact grant-
backs have been allowed directly in one case and have been allowed 
by indirection in another.87 The National Lead38 decree allowed 
88 Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 565. 
84 (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41 at 224. 
85 (D.C. N.J. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 426, revd. on other grounds (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. 
(2d) 719. 
86 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Alumi-
num Company of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333. 
87 Grant-backs have also been allowed at least in consent decrees. United States v. 
International Business Machines Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1956) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ,r68,245; 
United States v. Western Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1956) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. i!68,246. 
88 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
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for a grant-back clause where compulsory licensing was decreed of 
all patents then issued or to be issued within the next five years. 
There were only two expected licensees and each of them was in a 
position whereby if they were allowed to secure licenses to all of 
the defendants' patents but were not required to grant back recip-
rocal rights, conceivably the licensees would change places with the 
defendants in becoming the dominant factor in the industry. 
Prior to the TransWrap case the Supreme Court had occasion 
to deal with a grant-back clause in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United 
States.39 The lower court decree enjoined Hartford-Empire from 
providing that rights to improvements and inventions covering 
licensed machinery or processes or methods were to become the 
exclusive property of the lessor or vendor. Upon appeal to the 
Supreme Court the government conceded that grant-back provi-
sions were not illegal per se and that the injunction went beyond 
the field illegally monopolized. Without discussion the Court 
amended the decree to permit the inclusion of a grant-back clause 
in all licenses except certain glassmaking machinery. This case was 
a logical forerunner to TransWrap in that it recognized the valid-
ity of grant-backs in general but looked to the effect the particular 
clause would have on the industry. 
The single pervading thread of consistency in the decrees which 
have not allowed a grant-back clause is that the court felt that a 
grant-back clause would be detrimental to the restoration of compe-
tition in the industry. The courts have done their best not to harm 
defendants unnecessarily by the decrees.40 Only in United States 
v. Aluminum Company of America41 and in the General Electric 
lamp decree42 were companies required to grant a free license in 
which no grant-back was allowed. Alcoa's licenses themselves were 
39 323 U.S. 386 (1945). 
40 In United States v. General Electric Co. (lamps), (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 
835, the court indicated that the reason for not allowing a grant-back clause although 
compulsory licensing was decreed was to put General Electric at a competitive disad-
vantage. General Electric had so many natural advantages over its competitors that only 
by allowing its competitors to demand royalty free licenses from General Electric on 
General Electric's existing patents without allowing General Electric to demand licenses 
on its competitors' patents could competition be restored to the industry. While it seemed 
advisable to require General Electric to license all applicants for General Electric patents 
developed within five years of the decree, it did not seem necessary to prevent it from 
asking for licenses from an applicant in return. 
41 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333. Other decrees in which no grant-back was 
allowed but in which the defendant was allowed to charge reasonable royalties for the 
compulsory license are United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 360 (1947); 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 at 100 (1950); United States v. 
Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 at 232; United States v. 
General Electric Co. (lamps), (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835. 
42 See note 40 supra. 
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royalty free but had a grant-back clause. The grant-back clause 
was declared unenforceable. But the court was very careful to 
point out the adverse effects which the grant-back clause had had 
and the probable effects which its retention would have. An argu-
ment was raised as to the constitutionality of the decree which 
declared the licenses royalty-free but did not allow the grant-back 
clause. The court did not feel that it was necessary to pass upon 
the question, however, for Alcoa had previously argued that the 
grant-back provisions were of small importance in its patent policy 
and that the reason for Alcoa's royalty-free licensing was to im-
prove competitive conditions in the industry. To say now that the 
elimination of the grant-back clause was such a deprivation of 
property as to be unconstitutional was to place Alcoa in a bad light 
in regard to its overall patent policy. 
Conclusion 
When a patentee wishes to issue licenses containing a grant-
back clause he has to go through the same type of analysis which 
a court must go through when called upon to evaluate the legality 
of such a clause. But whereas the court is interested only in the 
overall effect of the clause, the licensor must also decide upon the 
particular terms of the clause. He must determine whether the 
grant-back shall be of a license-exclusive or nonexclusive-or 
whether it shall be an assignment. He must determine how broad 
the grant-back shall be, i.e., whether it shall demand merely im-
provements on the basic patent, all future patents in the field, or 
some middle ground, and he must decide during what period of 
time the clause will operate. The two criteria by which he should 
decide these questions are the minimum terms which will give him 
the legitimate protection which he desires, and the effect the clause 
will have on the licensees and the industry. It is reasonable to be-
lieve that often the licensor is not governed by these two limita-
tions, however, but rather by a third limitation inherent to busi-
ness, viz., the relative bargaining power of the licensor and the 
licensee. This limitation is apt to be of little help, however, for in 
a situation where licensees have sufficient bargaining power to resist 
the demands of the licensor, there is little chance that the most 
flagrant grant-back clause will bring about monopoly conditions. 
Although the court is not primarily interested in the individual 
terms of the clause but in the net effect of the clause on the licensor, 
licensees and the industry, an analysis of the individual terms will 
often show the real purpose and effect of the clause. It has been 
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suggested that in some cases a clause may help to induce competi-
tion in the industry. For example, the grant-back of a nonexclusive 
license, especially with authority to sublicense, may diffuse the 
benefits to all licensees and thus tend to encourage competitive use 
of the innovations.43 However that may be, the court should look 
to the purpose and effect of the clause in the context of the industry 
situation to determine the legality of the clause. It should be deter-
mined what the effect of the clause is on the licensor vis-a-vis the 
licensees and the industry, as well as what the effect of the clause 
is on the licensees vis-a-vis the licensor, the other licensees44 and the 
rest of the industry, and also what the effect of the clause is on the 
incentive to engage in research and to disseminate the fruits of such 
research on the part of the licensor, the licensees, and the remainder 
of the industry. 
The small patentee who wishes to protect himself in the future 
production of the patented article by use of a grant-back clause is 
in little danger of being charged with an antitrust violation. It is 
only the big firm in the industry which has had an aggressive patent 
policy which is apt to have its grant-back clauses found illegal. 
Even in that case, however, a grant-back clause need not cause 
trouble if the clause is restricted to the minimum terms needed for 
protection of the basic patent. 
Eric E. Bergsten, S.Ed. 
43 REPORT 229, but see note 44 infra. 
44 See Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem,'' 53 MICH. L. REv. 1093 at 1098 (1955). 
"Again it would seem that a further point should be added. Grant-backs may also 
affect a licensee's competitive position vis-a-vis other licensees especially where the grant-
back includes the right to sublicense. In a situation such as that in the General Electric 
Lamp Case [82 F. Supp. 753] the grant-back of a license to General Electric by a small 
licensee such as Chicago Miniature Lamp Company and the extension of that license 
to a larger licensee such as Westinghouse may adversely affect the competitive position 
of Chicago Miniature with respect to Westinghouse independently of other effects." 
